MEA CULPA DO FMI

O FMI faz mea culpa num relatório onde se procura perceber por que é que os mecanismo de aviso do Fundo não detectaram os sinais de alarme que conduziram à crise financeira de 2008. Há muitas razões para que tal tenha acontecido, mas a mais provável é que, antes de 2007, quase toda a gente pensava que uma crise financeira nos Estados Unidos e nos países desenvolvidos era praticamente impossível, e que os mercados corrigiriam naturalmente os desequilíbrios que aparecessem. Estavamos todos (ou quase todos) enganados. É exactamente isso que nos diz o relatório do FMI. Aqui está um excerto:

"[The report] finds that the IMF provided few clear warnings about the risks and vulnerabilities associated with the impending crisis before its outbreak. The banner message was one of continued optimism after more than a decade of benign economic conditions and low macroeconomic volatility. The IMF, in its bilateral surveillance of the United States and the United Kingdom, largely endorsed policies and financial practices that were seen as fostering rapid innovation and growth. The belief that financial markets were fundamentally sound and that large financial institutions could weather any likely problem lessened the sense of urgency to address risks or to worry about possible severe adverse outcomes. Surveillance also paid insufficient attention to risks of contagion or spillovers from a crisis in advanced economies. Advanced economies were not included in the Vulnerability Exercise launched after the Asian crisis, despite internal discussions and calls to this effect from Board members and others...
The IMF’s ability to correctly identify the mounting risks was hindered by a high degree of groupthink, intellectual capture, a general mindset that a major financial crisis in large advanced economies was unlikely, and inadequate analytical approaches."

O relatório completo pode ser lido aqui.